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457 
COMMENT 
Waiver, Work Product, and Worry: A Case for Clarifying 
the Waiver Doctrine in Oklahoma 
I. Introduction 
Complex litigation often puts millions—if not billions—of dollars at 
stake. Such litigation often involves multiple parties and myriad legal 
claims and can easily result in a complex web of co-parties and third-party 
defendants, counterclaims and crossclaims. Danger exists in these suits, 
however, because the state’s complete lack of guidance regarding waiver of 
the work product protection via voluntary production to third parties leaves 
Oklahoma’s lawyers under the threat of making monumental mistakes. For 
lawyers prosecuting or defending such suits in Oklahoma state courts, this 
lurking issue should give pause.  
Imagine the following, relatively routine scenario: a corporate client 
comes to an attorney expecting either to sue or be sued. As the client tells 
their story, the attorney realizes that at least one other individual or entity is 
likely to be a party in the possible litigation or shares a common interest 
with their client. In the course of preparing for the anticipated litigation, the 
attorney realizes that he or she will need to share information with the third 
party. Specifically, the attorney wants to share documents or other materials 
that have been prepared in anticipation of the suit. Obviously, however, the 
attorney does not want the materials to be discoverable. Cognizant of the 
fact that, under Oklahoma law, the disclosure of the materials to a third 
party under these circumstances will waive the attorney-client privilege,
1
 
the attorney is left reliant on the work product protection. Does disclosure 
of work-product protected materials to a third party with an interest in 
anticipated—but unfiled—litigation (specifically, potential joint parties in 
said litigation) waive the work product protection under Oklahoma’s 
Discovery Code? 
Oklahoma courts have not yet addressed the issue, and federal courts and 
the courts of other states have provided mixed answers. As a result, 
attorneys are left with a difficult choice: risk disclosure of materials that, if 
seen by an adversary, may substantially weaken the attorney’s case; or 
refrain from sharing materials with a potential co-party and delay 
strategizing until the protection is available after the commencement of 
litigation. Until Oklahoma addresses this issue, attorneys in the state must 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra Part III. 
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attempt to navigate such troublesome choices without any indication of how 
the courts will resolve the issue. 
This Comment explores this issue and provides a recommendation for 
the work product protection in Oklahoma that furthers the purpose of the 
doctrine while also allowing lawyers the flexibility needed to adequately 
prepare for anticipated multiparty litigation. Part II briefly reviews the 
history of the work product protection, including its adoption in Oklahoma. 
Part III provides important context by distinguishing the work product 
protection from the attorney-client privilege and explaining why waiver of 
one does not necessarily result in waiver of the other. Part IV discusses the 
related—but distinguishable—doctrines of subject matter waiver and 
selective waiver. Parts V and VI examine the majority and minority 
positions on waiver, respectively. Given Oklahoma’s place within the Tenth 
Circuit, Part VII discusses that court’s waiver jurisprudence in greater 
detail. Finally, Part VIII analyzes Oklahoma’s work-product case law and 
statutes and provides a suggested approach to waiver. Specifically, this 
Comment suggests that Oklahoma adopt a waiver standard that allows 
voluntary disclosure of materials protected by the work product protection 
so long as that disclosure is not to an adversary and does not significantly 
increase the probability that the information will fall into the hands of an 
adversary. 
II. Overview of the Work Product Protection 
The work product doctrine, first recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1947, allows a lawyer to "work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their 
counsel."
2
 The protection exists "not to protect the evidence from disclosure 
to the outside world but rather to protect it only from the knowledge of 
opposing counsel and his client."
3
 In its current form, the doctrine protects 
documents prepared by or for a party or party's representative in 
anticipation of litigation.
4
 Such documents, however, referred to hereinafter 
as "work product," have not always received such protection. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). 
 3. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (3d 
ed. 2010) (quoting James A. Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client 
Privilege: Privilege and “Work Product” Under Open Discovery (Part II), 42 U. DET. L.J. 
253, 290 (1965)). 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
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The Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor establishing the work product 
doctrine was a watershed moment. Prior to the decision, courts across the 
country failed to reach a consensus as to whether work product was 
protected from discovery at all, and those courts finding that work product 
was protected failed to reach a consensus on the reasoning underlying their 
decisions.
5
 Moreover, many courts held that work product was subject to 
discovery, allowing enterprising lawyers to take advantage of what was 
arguably a glaring loophole in the relatively new Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.
6
 The problem drew the attention of the Advisory Committee, 
which, in 1946, proposed an addition to then-Rule 30(b) in order to address 
the issue of unprotected work product.
7
 However, the Court—which had at 
that point granted certiorari in Hickman—rejected the proposed rule, likely 
determining "that clarification of its views . . . should await the Court's 
decision."
8
  
Shortly after rejecting the proposed rule, the Court delivered its decision 
in Hickman. Closely paralleling the Advisory Committee's proposed rule, 
the Court held that, presumptively, "written materials obtained or prepared 
by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free 
from discovery in all cases."
9
 The Court, however, determined that the 
presumption may be rebutted "[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts 
remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is 
essential to the preparation of one's case," in which cases "discovery may 
properly be had."
10
 Over twenty years later, in 1970, the work product 
doctrine was codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Rule 
                                                                                                                 
 5. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2021. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. The proposed amendment read  
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained 
or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in 
anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of 
production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the 
production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him 
undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the production or 
inspection of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in 
Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert. 
Id. 
 8. Leland L. Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents 
and the Work Product of the Lawyer, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 507 (1958). 
 9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
 10. Id. 
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26(b)(3).
11
 The Rule has not been "significantly changed" since its adoption 
in 1970 and is generally seen as codifying the protections outlined in 
Hickman.
12
  
Oklahoma courts were slower to adopt the work product doctrine. In 
1966, four years before codification of the federal work product protection 
and nineteen years after the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court finally recognized the work product protection.
13
 
The doctrine was then codified as section 3203 of title 12 in 1982,
14
 and 
moved to its current location in section 3226 of title 12 in 1989.
15
 
Oklahoma's version of the work product protection is—and historically has 
                                                                                                                 
 11. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2023. Rule 26(b)(3) currently reads: 
 (A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover 
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 
26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if: 
 (i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and 
 (ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare 
its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent 
by other means. 
 (B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those 
materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other 
representative concerning the litigation. 
 (C) Previous Statement. Any party or other person may, on request and 
without the required showing, obtain the person's own previous statement about 
the action or its subject matter. If the request is refused, the person may move 
for a court order, and Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses. A 
previous statement is either: 
 (i) a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved; or 
 (ii) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 
recording—or a transcription of it—that recites substantially verbatim the 
person's oral statement. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 12. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2023 n.13 ("In 1987, gender–specific language 
was changed, but without effecting any substantive change in the rule. In 2007, the rule was 
‘restyled,’ but with the avowed purpose not to change its meaning. As amended effective 
2010, Rule 26(b)(4) invokes Rule 26(b)(3) protection for interactions between expert 
witnesses and lawyers."). 
 13. See Carman v. Fishel, 1966 OK 130, ¶¶ 12-16, 418 P.2d 963, 968-70, overruled on 
other grounds by Tuller v. Shallcross, 1994 OK 133, ¶ 15, 886 P.2d 481, 485. 
 14. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3203 (Supp. 1982). 
 15. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 1989).  
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been—almost identical to the federal work product protection, and the 
differences that do exist are almost exclusively stylistic.
16
  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has summarized its general interpretation 
of Oklahoma's work product protection, stating that 
[o]rdinary work product consists of factual information garnered 
by counsel acting in a professional capacity in anticipation of 
litigation. It includes facts gathered from the parties and 
witnesses, and materials discovered through investigations of 
counsel or his/her agents. Although ordinary work product is 
cloaked with a qualified immunity, it may be discovered upon a 
showing of the inability to secure the substantial equivalent of 
the materials without undue hardship. The opinion work product 
area is carved out to protect the right of counsel to privacy in the 
analysis and preparation of the client’s case. Opinion work 
product includes the lawyer's trial strategies, theories, and 
inferences drawn from the research and investigative efforts of 
counsel. Historically, the thoughts of an attorney have been free 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Section 3226(B)(3) currently reads: 
 a. Unless as provided by paragraph 4 of this subsection, a party may not 
discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative, including the 
other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent. Subject 
to paragraph 4 of this subsection, such materials may be discovered if: 
 (1) they are otherwise discoverable under paragraph 1 of this subsection, 
and 
 (2) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare 
its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent 
by other means. 
 b. If the court orders discovery of such materials, the court shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal 
theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the litigation. 
 c. A party or other person may, upon request and without the required 
showing, obtain the person's own previous statement about the action or its 
subject matter. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order, 
and the provisions of paragraph 4 of subsection A of Section 3237 of this title 
apply to the award of expenses. A previous statement is either: 
 (1) a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved, or 
 (2) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 
recording, or a transcription thereof, which recites substantially verbatim the 
person's oral statement. 
12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(B)(3) (Supp. 2014). 
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from invasion, and the impressions, theories, trial tactics, and 
opinions of counsel have been sheltered from disclosure. 
Opinion work product enjoys a virtual immunity from discovery, 
and it may be discovered only under extraordinary 
circumstances.
17
 
While the court’s general interpretation of the doctrine is in line with the 
federal courts’ interpretation of the doctrine, Oklahoma courts, unlike the 
federal courts, have not yet addressed the issue of whether disclosure of 
materials otherwise protected by the work product protection to a third 
party constitutes a waiver of the protection. Given the similarity of 
Oklahoma's Discovery Code to the federal rules regulating discovery, 
Oklahoma courts have looked to federal authority when construing 
comparable provisions in Oklahoma law.
18
 Thus, it is necessary to examine 
federal case law on the subject.  
III. Distinguishing the Work Product Protection 
from the Attorney-Client Privilege 
Before engaging in a discussion of waiver of the work product 
protection, it is important to distinguish the work product protection from 
the attorney-client privilege. At the federal level, the attorney-client 
privilege remains uncodified; thus, “[i]n federal criminal cases or in civil 
cases governed by federal law, the court must apply the common law 
‘interpreted in the light of reason and experience.’”19 When applicable, the 
federal attorney-client privilege 
applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or 
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the 
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, 
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication 
is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of 
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the 
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily 
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Ellison v. Gray, 1985 OK 35, ¶ 7, 702 P.2d 360, 363 (footnotes omitted).  
 18. See, e.g., Scott v. Peterson, 2005 OK 84, ¶ 22, 126 P.3d 1232, 1238. 
 19. 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5473 (1986) (footnotes omitted). The federal common law applies 
only to “federal criminal cases or in civil cases governed by federal law.” Id. The Federal 
Rules of Evidence provide that “state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for 
which state law supplies the rule of decision.” FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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assistance in some legal proceeding and not (d) for the purpose 
of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) 
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
20
 
Oklahoma also recognizes the attorney-client privilege; however, in 
contrast to the federal common law, Oklahoma has extensively codified the 
privilege.
21
 
The work product protection and the attorney-client privilege are closely 
related and often are at issue in the same case. However, “[a]s the [United 
States Supreme] Court recognized . . . the work-product doctrine is distinct 
from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.”22 Indeed, the work 
product protection and the attorney-client privilege “are independent 
protections that serve different purposes.”23 Federal courts have regularly 
recognized the distinction. As one court noted, 
[t]hough they both operate to protect information from 
discovery, the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client 
privilege serve different purposes. The purpose behind the 
attorney-client privilege is to “‘encourage clients to make full 
disclosure of facts to counsel so that he may properly, 
competently, and ethically carry out his representation. The 
ultimate aim is to promote the proper administration of justice.’” 
The work-product doctrine, by contrast, “promotes the adversary 
                                                                                                                 
 20. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2017 (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)). 
 21. The Oklahoma attorney-client privilege provides, in part, that 
 B. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client: 
 1. Between the client or a representative of the client and the client’s 
attorney or a representative of the attorney; 
 2. Between the attorney and a representative of the attorney; 
 3. By the client or a representative of the client or the client’s attorney or a 
representative of the attorney to an attorney or a representative of an attorney 
representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of 
common interest therein;  
 4. Between representatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client; or 
 5. Among attorneys and their representatives representing the same client. 
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(B) (Supp. 2014). 
 22. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975). 
 23. 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND 
COMMENTARY Rule 26 (Feb. 2017 update). 
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system directly by protecting the confidentiality of papers 
prepared by or on behalf of attorneys in anticipation of litigation. 
Protecting attorneys' work product promotes the adversary 
system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases without fear that 
their work product will be used against their clients.”24 
Put another way, “the attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
doctrine serve different purposes: the former protects the attorney-client 
relationship by safeguarding confidential communications, whereas the 
latter promotes the adversary process by insulating an attorney’s litigation 
preparation from discovery.”25 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also 
recognized the distinction, finding that “[a]lthough the two are closely 
related, an attorney's work product is not synonymous with the attorney-
client privilege . . . . [I]nformation which is not protected from discovery by 
the attorney-client privilege may nonetheless be exempt as work product.”26 
Recognizing the differences and distinct purposes of the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product protection is important in the context of 
analyzing the waiver doctrine. Because “[t]he attorney-client privilege has 
its basis in the confidential nature of the communication . . . the reason for 
the privilege ordinarily ceases to exist if confidentiality is destroyed by 
voluntary disclosure to a third person.”27 In other words, because disclosure 
undermines the privilege’s purpose, it logically follows that disclosure to a 
third party waives the privilege.
28
 However, the purpose of the work 
product protection, as discussed above, is promotion of the adversary 
process, not strict confidentiality. As such, disclosure to a third party is not 
necessarily contrary to the purpose of the protection, and waiver is not 
always the necessary remedy.  
In sum, while the work product protection and the attorney-client 
privilege are often considered in tandem, they are distinct and serve 
different purposes. When considering the work product protection, 
importing principles of waiver applicable to the attorney-client privilege 
would result in an unfairly narrow reading of the protection that is at odds 
with its purpose. As such, waiver of the work product protection must be 
considered separately from waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  
                                                                                                                 
 24. In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 164 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
 25. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 26. Ellison v. Gray, 1985 OK 35, ¶ 8, 702 P.2d 360, 363. 
 27. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2024. 
 28. Indeed, it is the rule that waiver results from disclosure of materials protected by the 
attorney-client privilege to third parties. See id. § 2016.4 (citing cases where disclosure 
resulted in waiver). 
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IV. Subject-Matter Waiver and Selective Waiver: Federal Rule of Evidence 
502 and Title 12, Section 2502 of the Oklahoma Statutes 
It is also important, prior to discussing waiver of the work product 
protection, to discuss two tangential issues that are closely related to—
though distinct from—voluntary disclosures to third parties: subject-matter 
waiver and selective waiver.  
A. Subject-Matter Waiver 
The first issue—subject-matter waiver—deals with the scope of waiver 
once a disclosure has occurred. “The traditional rule is that, where a party 
has revealed a privileged communication, the court will require the party to 
reveal not only the communication for which the privilege has been waived, 
but also any privileged communications on the same subject matter which 
fairness requires must be revealed.”29 The traditional rule, however, has 
been modified in both federal and Oklahoma courts. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 provides that, under certain circumstances, 
both purposeful and inadvertent disclosures may not result in waiver.
30
 
Similarly, title 12, section 2502 of the Oklahoma Statutes, in addition to 
defining the work product protection, protects both purposeful and 
inadvertent disclosures.
31
 While seemingly broad in scope, Rule 502—and, 
presumably, the similar language in subsections E and F of section 2502 of 
the Oklahoma rule—was adopted with a limited purpose. As one author 
points out,  
Rule 502 reflects an attempt by Congress to enable litigants to 
minimize the extraordinary cost of civil discovery in federal 
proceedings without risking broad waiver of privilege in either 
federal or state proceedings. Rule 502 does this in two ways. 
First, Rule 502 limits subject matter waiver to voluntary 
disclosures and eliminates subject matter waiver for inadvertent 
disclosure. Second, Rule 502 enables federal courts to adopt 
protective orders and confidentiality agreements, including non-
waiver provisions, that will be binding in other federal and state 
proceedings.
32
 
                                                                                                                 
 29. 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:76 (3d ed. 2015). 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 502(a)-(c).  
 31. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E)-(F) (Supp. 2014).  
 32. 1 GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 29, § 1:76 (footnotes omitted). 
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Thus, Rule 502 and section 2502 have no bearing on—and should not be 
interpreted as controlling when—deciding whether voluntary disclosures to 
third parties of materials protected by the work product protection waive 
the protection. Rather, as the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out, the 
purpose of the Rule is “to limit the consequences of inadvertent disclosure” 
by providing “that if there is a waiver of privilege, it applies only to the 
specific information disclosed and not the broader subject matter.”33  
This approach is a departure from the previous rule of subject matter 
disclosure, which, under Rule 502, remains largely applicable to voluntary 
disclosure. Thus, under the traditional rule, if purposeful disclosure of a 
privileged or protected document results in waiver, it may result in waiver 
of the privilege with regard to all documents regarding the same subject 
matter. Such potentially damning consequences make clarity regarding the 
effects of voluntary disclosure all the more important.  
B. Selective Waiver 
A second closely related issue—selective waiver—addresses which 
parties can take advantage of a waiver of a privilege or protection. Under 
the doctrine of selective waiver, waiver with regard to one party—generally 
the government—does not amount to a waiver of the privilege or protection 
as to other parties. In other words, the doctrine generally dictates that 
“voluntary disclosures to government agencies should result only in . . . 
waiver as to the government but not as to third party litigants.”34 Selective 
waiver arguments most often appear in the context of government 
investigations of corporations, in which the corporation wishes to cooperate 
with the government while avoiding waiver of a privilege or protection with 
respect to private litigants.
35
 Selective waiver is, in a sense, a roundabout 
way of allowing disclosure to a third party without waiving the privilege as 
to other parties.  
Selective waiver, however, is a distinct issue from voluntary disclosure 
to a potential joint party. While disclosure to potential joint parties may 
further the purposes of the adversary system, selective waiver, which would 
allow disclosure directly to an adversary, arguably contravenes it. 
Highlighting the difference, “courts that have rejected selective waiver for 
work product have done so on the grounds that the government is an 
adversary or potential adversary.”36 Applying this logic, courts have widely 
                                                                                                                 
 33. S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 3 (2008), as reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1305, 1306-07. 
 34. 1 GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 29, § 1:102. 
 35. See, e.g., id.  
 36. Id.  
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rejected selective waiver.
37
 In the context of the work product protection, 
even the Eighth Circuit, which decided the seminal case regarding selective 
waiver of the attorney client privilege,
38
 has rejected selective waiver in the 
context of the work product protection.
39
  
Despite the courts’ widespread rejection of the doctrine, selective waiver 
has in some instances been embraced by the legislative branches. At the 
federal level, when adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a), some 
commentators argue that Congress may have inadvertently codified the 
selective waiver doctrine.
40
 Although legislative intent suggests that 
Congress and the Advisory Committee did not intend to codify selective 
waiver,
41
 Rule 502(a) “sounds very much like ‘selective waiver’, albeit 
without the name.”42 While many commentators disagree with the 
contention that Rule 502(a) explicitly adopted the selective waiver doctrine, 
some have argued that, in operation, Rule 502 may allow selective waiver.
43
  
At the state level, Oklahoma has unambiguously written selective waiver 
into its Discovery Code, providing that “[d]isclosure of a communication or 
information meeting the requirements of . . . the work-product doctrine to a 
governmental office, agency or political subdivision in the exercise of its 
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority does not operate as a 
waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of nongovernmental persons 
or entities.”44 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns. Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006); In re 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 306-07 (6th Cir. 
2002); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1429 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 38. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 39. See In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 
844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428 (discussing In re 
Chrysler Motors Corp.). 
 40. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5442; see also 1 GREENWALD ET AL., 
supra note 29, § 1:102. 
 41. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee Explanatory Note, Committee 
Letter (“The Advisory Committee determined that it would not propose adoption of a 
selective waiver provision.”). 
 42. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5442. 
 43. See, e.g., 1 GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 29, § 1:102 (“Rule 502 may limit the 
scope of a waiver resulting from disclosure of privileged materials to the government.”); 
Patrick M. Emery, Comment, The Death of Selective Waiver: How New Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502 Ends the Nationalization Debate, 27 J.L. & COM. 231, 293 (2009) (“Generally, 
502(a) allows selective, intentional waiver of attorney-client and work product material. This 
is not selective waiver, it is selective disclosure, but it can become selective waiver when 
read in conjunction with subsections (d) and (e).”). 
 44. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F) (Supp. 2014). 
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In sum, given the continued viability of subject matter waiver with 
regard to voluntary disclosures, it is crucial that clarity exists regarding the 
waiver doctrine. Moreover, while this Comment addresses only voluntary 
disclosure, Oklahoma’s adoption of the selective waiver doctrine may 
impact its analysis of waiver in regard to voluntary disclosure.  
V. The Majority Position on Waiver of the Work Product Doctrine 
Even if materials are protected by the work product protection, "[t]he 
privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute," and, 
"[l]ike other qualified privileges, it may be waived."
45
 Ultimately, what 
constitutes a waiver of the work product protection is a matter of policy 
based on differing understandings of the policies underlying the protection. 
While the United States Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the issue, 
the weight of federal jurisprudence indicates that disclosure to a third party 
does not waive the protection of the work product doctrine unless the 
disclosure "has substantially increased the opportunities for potential 
adversaries to obtain the information."
46
 Similarly, many states have found 
that disclosure does not necessarily result in waiver. The majority 
position—that waiver of the work product protection occurs only if 
disclosure "substantially increases" the likelihood that adversaries will 
obtain the information—is the position most in tune to the purpose of the 
work product protection: "to protect [evidence] only from the knowledge of 
opposing counsel and his client."
47
 
A. Federal Jurisprudence  
1. D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit has decided several of the leading cases regarding 
waiver of the work product protection, including one of the earliest circuit-
level decisions—United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.48 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) was party to two antitrust 
suits, one brought by MCI Communications Corporation and MCI 
Telecommunications Corporation (MCI) in the Northern District of Illinois 
(“suit one”), and the other brought by the United States in the District of 
D.C. (“suit two”).49 MCI furnished certain “database documents” to the 
                                                                                                                 
 45. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). 
 46. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2024. 
 47. Id. (citation omitted). 
 48. 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 49. Id. at 1288. 
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United States “upon an assurance of confidentiality from the 
Government.”50 AT&T then sought discovery of the documents from the 
United States in suit two.
51
 Following a decision by a special master finding 
on several grounds that the database documents were no longer protected 
by the work product protection, the United States appealed the decision to 
the district court, and MCI moved to intervene.
52
 The district court denied 
both the appeal and the motion, holding that MCI had waived the work 
product protection by disclosing the database documents to the United 
States.
53
 MCI then appealed the denial of its motion to intervene and the 
discovery order requiring disclosure of the database documents.
54
 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit first looked to decisions of several district 
courts, finding that “[s]everal of the decisions have turned on whether the 
transferor has ‘common interests’ with the transferee.”55 The court then 
looked to the purpose underlying the work product protection—“to protect 
information against opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a 
particular confidential relationship, in order to encourage effective trial 
preparation”—before holding that “[a] disclosure made in the pursuit of 
such trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against 
opponents, should be allowed without waiver of the privilege.”56 The court 
further elaborated on the circumstances under which waiver was 
inappropriate, stating that 
[t]he existence of common interests between transferor and 
transferee is relevant to deciding whether the disclosure is 
consistent with the nature of the work product privilege. But 
“common interests” should not be construed as narrowly limited 
to co-parties. So long as transferor and transferee anticipate 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 1289. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1289-90. 
 53. Id. at 1290. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1298.  
In applying [the common interest] standard courts have held the work product 
privilege not to be waived by disclosures between attorneys for parties “having 
a mutual interest in litigation,” or between parties which were potential co-
defendants to an antitrust suit, or between attorneys representing parties 
“sharing such a common interest in litigation, actual or prospective,” or 
between parties one of whose interests in prospective litigation may turn on the 
success of the other party in a separate litigation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 56. Id. at 1299. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
470 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:457 
 
 
litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or 
issues, they have strong common interests in sharing the fruit of 
the trial preparation efforts. Moreover, with common interests on 
a particular issue against a common adversary, the transferee is 
not at all likely to disclose the work product material to the 
adversary. When the transfer to a party with such common 
interests is conducted under a guarantee of confidentiality, the 
case against waiver is even stronger.
57
 
Applying this standard, the court held that MCI had not waived its work 
product protection when it disclosed the database documents to the United 
States.
58
 
The court recently clarified and refined its waiver jurisprudence in 
United States v. Deloitte LLP.
59
 There, Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”) 
provided documents (pertinent here are a memo, an accompanying flow 
chart, and a tax opinion) to its auditor, Deloitte, prior to the commencement 
of litigation.
60
 During discovery in the subsequent lawsuit by Dow against 
the United States regarding "the tax treatment of two partnerships owned by 
Dow . . . and two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries," the United States 
attempted to compel Deloitte, who was not a party, to produce the 
documents.
61
 Deloitte refused to produce the documents, and Dow 
intervened.
62
 The United States conceded that the materials prepared by 
Dow were work product, leaving only the issue of "whether disclosing 
work product to an independent auditor constitutes waiver" for the court's 
consideration.
63
  
The court first considered the purpose of the work product doctrine (to 
"promote[] the adversary process by insulating an attorney's litigation 
preparation from discovery") and examined prior cases before determining 
that "the voluntary disclosure of attorney work product to an adversary or a 
conduit to an adversary waives work-product protection for that material."
64
 
For purposes of this analysis, the court determined an “adversary” to be a 
person or entity who may be an “adversary in the sort of litigation the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 1299-1300. 
 58. Id. at 1301. 
 59. 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 60. Id. at 133. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 133-34. 
 63. Id. at 139. 
 64. Id. at 139-40. 
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[documents] address.”65 If the rule were any different—for example, if “the 
possibility of a future dispute between [the disclosing party and the party to 
whom a document was disclosed] render[ed] [the party to whom a 
document was disclosed] a potential adversary”—then “any voluntary 
disclosure would constitute waiver,” an outcome at odds with the purpose 
of the work product doctrine.
66
 Whether disclosure is to a “conduit to an 
adversary” is determined by applying the “maintenance of secrecy” 
standard.
67
  
While the maintenance of secrecy standard is a “fact intensive” one, the 
D.C. Circuit recognized that courts applying it “have generally made two 
discrete inquiries in assessing whether disclosure constitutes waiver.”68 
First, courts ask “whether the disclosing party has engaged in self-interested 
selective disclosure by revealing its work product to some adversaries but 
not to others.”69 Such disclosure weighs in favor of waiver.70 The second 
prong of the maintenance of secrecy standard requires “examin[ing] 
whether the disclosing party had a reasonable basis for believing that the 
recipient would keep the disclosed material confidential.”71 The court 
recognized two general ways by which this prong of the maintenance of 
secrecy test could be satisfied. First, “[a] reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality may derive from common litigation interests between the 
disclosing party and the recipient . . . . because when common litigation 
interests are present, ‘the transferee is not at all likely to disclose the work 
product material to the adversary.’”72 Alternatively, the “reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality” may derive from a “relatively strong and 
sufficiently unqualified” confidentiality agreement.73 Generally, the 
presence of either consideration militates against a finding of waiver. 
However, the “reasonable expectation of confidentiality” test is likely not 
restricted to the two considerations defined by the court. 
When considering the facts of the case at hand, the court seemed to 
expand the confidentiality agreement consideration, posing the question as 
“whether a confidentiality agreement or similar assurance gave Dow a 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 140. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 141. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. 
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reasonable expectation that Deloitte would keep its work product 
confidential.”74 The court found that the relationship between Dow and 
Deloitte, its independent auditor, was sufficient to be a “similar assurance” 
of the reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
75
 As such, the court held 
that the maintenance of secrecy standard had been met; thus Dow’s 
disclosure to Deloitte had not been a disclosure into a “conduit to an 
adversary,” and the work product protection had not been waived. 
2. Seventh Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit is far from the only circuit to reach a similar 
conclusion. In Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA,
76
 the Seventh Circuit 
determined that waiver of the work product protection occurs when 
disclosure “substantially increase[s] the opportunities for potential 
adversaries to obtain the information.”77 There, the documents at issue were 
prepared by an environmental consultant for the government in preparation 
for Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) litigation against Appleton Papers and other alleged 
polluters.
78
 The government cited to unreleased portions of the reports 
prepared by the consultant when preparing consent decrees with regard to 
other alleged polluters.
79
 Appleton Papers, unsuccessful in obtaining the 
reports by any other means, filed a Freedom of Information Act request, to 
which the government replied by asserting the work product protection.
80
 
After determining that the reports were protected by the work product 
protection, the court determined “that the government waived work product 
immunity for the portions of the documents it did use in the two consent 
decrees” because it had substantially increased the chances that Appleton 
Papers would be able to obtain the information.
81
 The court also 
determined, however, that those portions of the report not cited to in the 
consent decrees remained protected by the work product protection.
82
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 702 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 77. Id. at 1025. 
 78. Id. at 1021. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1025. 
 82. Id.  
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3. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit has also held that waiver of the work product protection 
occurs if the disclosure “substantially increase[s] the opportunities for 
potential adversaries to obtain the information.”83 In an Ecuadorian 
proceeding by Ecuadorian plaintiffs against Chevron for alleged pollution 
of the Amazon, an Ecuadorian court ordered that a neutral expert draft a 
report on Texaco’s (Chevron’s predecessor in interest) effect on the 
rainforest.
84
 Alleging that the expert had colluded with the plaintiffs, 
Chevron attempted to engage in discovery in the United States in order to 
obtain records from 3TM—an environmental consulting firm hired by the 
plaintiffs.
85
 According to Chevron, the expert in the Ecuadorian 
proceedings had relied on reports prepared by 3TM.
86
 In the U.S. discovery 
proceedings, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs, who intervened on behalf of 3TM, 
argued, inter alia, that 3TM was protected by the work product doctrine.
87
 
The court determined that, by disclosing the documents to the Ecuadorian 
expert, 3TM had waived the work product protection.
88
 Under U.S. law, the 
disclosure to the Ecuadorian expert waived the work product protection 
because “Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that when experts testify before a court, 
they must submit a report disclosing ‘the data or other information’ they 
have considered in reaching their conclusions,” substantially increasing the 
likelihood that a potential adversary will obtain that information.
89
 The 
Fifth Circuit has reached similar conclusions on other occasions.
90
  
4. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit agrees that “a disclosure to a third party does not 
necessarily waive the protection of the work-product doctrine” unless “the 
disclosure . . . enable[s] an adversary to gain access to the information.”91 
After Westinghouse Electric Corporation was awarded a contract to build 
the Philippines’s first nuclear power plant, allegations emerged that 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted). 
 84. Id. at 375. 
 85. Id. at 376. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 377. 
 88. Id. at 378. 
 89. Id. (citation omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., Shields v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 91. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
474 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:457 
 
 
Westinghouse had bribed Philippine officials to obtain the contract.
92
 The 
allegations resulted in an investigation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), leading Westinghouse to retain outside counsel for the 
purpose of conducting an internal investigation.
93
 The law firm prepared 
two letters reporting their findings, one of which was shown to the SEC.
94
 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) subsequently engaged in its own 
investigation, in which a grand jury subpoenaed the letters prepared by 
outside counsel reporting the findings of their internal investigation.
95
 After 
entering into a confidentiality agreement, Westinghouse disclosed the 
letters to the DOJ.
96
  
In a subsequent suit by the Philippines against Westinghouse, “the 
Republic requested that Westinghouse produce the documents that it had 
made available to the SEC and to the DOJ,” which Westinghouse refused.97 
On appeal, the Third Circuit first discussed the purpose of the work product 
doctrine—“to protect an attorney's work product from falling into the hands 
of an adversary”—before holding that “a party who discloses documents 
protected by the work-product doctrine may continue to assert the doctrine's 
protection only when the disclosure furthers the doctrine's underlying 
goal.”98 Here, the court determined that Westinghouse’s voluntary 
disclosure of the documents to the government—even if made to rebut 
erroneous charges or obtain leniency with regard to valid charges—waived 
the work product protection because the rationale underlying the disclosure 
was “foreign to the objectives underlying the work-product doctrine.”99 
5. Eleventh Circuit 
When private plaintiffs cooperated with the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission (EEOC) during a joint claim, the Eleventh 
Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the private plaintiffs’ 
disclosure of materials to the EEOC constituted waiver of the work product 
protection for those materials.
100
 The private plaintiffs were later severed 
after their claims were dismissed.
101
 When the defendant attempted to 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 1418. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1419. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1420. 
 98. Id. at 1428-29. 
 99. Id. at 1429. 
 100. Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 101. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/4
2018]       COMMENT 475 
 
 
compel disclosure of the shared documents by the EEOC, the court 
“summarily reject[ed] [their] waiver argument, noting that the transfer was 
made at the time that the private plaintiffs' attorneys and counsel for the 
EEOC were engaged in the preparation of a joint trial.”102 It is worth noting 
that the court seemed to place special emphasis on the fact that the 
disclosure by the private plaintiffs took place during joint preparation for 
trial.
103
 While not directly stating the court’s view on waiver of the work 
product doctrine, the outcome of the case necessitates an understanding that 
the court views disclosure to a third party as not necessarily waiving the 
work product protection. 
B. State Jurisprudence 
As discussed above, section 3226 of Oklahoma’s Discovery Code 
closely resembles Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
104
 Many 
other states have likewise adopted discovery rules—particularly, rules 
regarding the work product protection—that are identical or similar to the 
federal scheme. Unlike the federal courts, however, which have mostly—
though not unanimously—allowed disclosure to non-adversarial third 
parties without resulting in waiver of the work product protection,
105
 state 
courts have been less consistent. Like the majority of federal courts, several 
states have found that voluntary disclosure to a third party does not result in 
waiver of the work product protection. 
1. Washington 
Washington Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26
106
 is similar, though not 
identical, to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
107
 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 103. Id. (“Subsequent to that consolidation and, more importantly, prior to the dismissal 
of the private parties' suits, the attorneys for the private plaintiffs turned over to the EEOC 
certain witness statements and notes from interviews with witnesses.” (footnote omitted)). 
 104. See supra Part II. 
 105. See supra Section V.A. 
 106. The Washington Rules of Civil Procedure provide: 
Subject to the provisions of subsection (b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain 
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
subsection (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative 
(including a party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) 
only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of 
the materials in the preparation of such party's case and that the party is unable 
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required 
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Washington Rules of Evidence contain a provision relating to waiver of the 
work product protection.
108
 The Washington rule is substantially identical 
to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 502.
109
 
Given the silence of Washington’s Rules of Evidence and Civil 
Procedure, the issue of waiver by voluntary disclosure was left to 
Washington’s courts. In Limstrom v. Ladenburg,110 the Washington Court 
of Appeals for the first time considered the effect of disclosure on the work 
product protection.
111
 The issue for the court was whether the prosecutor’s 
“disclosure of fact-gathering documents from its criminal litigation files to 
criminal defense attorneys . . . waive[d] the work product exemption as to 
other attorneys and parties outside a particular criminal case?”112 To resolve 
the issue of first impression, the court looked to other jurisdictions, 
determining that “generally, a party can waive the attorney work product 
privilege as a result of its own actions. If a party discloses documents to 
other persons with the intention that an adversary can see the documents, 
waiver generally results.”113 The court then held that the involuntary nature 
of the disclosures made by the prosecutor resulted in no waiver of the work 
product protection.
114
 In the absence of a statutory directive mandating 
waiver as the result of voluntary disclosures, Washington courts seem to 
have interpreted the work product protection as allowing disclosure to third 
parties so long as there is no “intention that an adversary can see the 
documents.” 
2. Missouri 
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 56.01
115
 is similar to the rule governing 
work product in Washington.
116
 Unlike Washington, though, Missouri has 
                                                                                                                 
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26(b)(4). 
 107. Compare WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26(b)(4), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 108. WASH. R. EVID. 502. 
 109. Compare WASH. R. EVID. 502, with FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 110. 39 P.3d 351 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 111. Id. at 356. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 357 (citation omitted). 
 114. Id. at 358. 
 115. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 56.01(b)(3) reads 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 56.01(b)(4), a party may obtain discovery of 
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Rule 56.01(b)(1) 
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or 
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no rule addressing the effect of voluntary or inadvertent disclosure of 
materials on the work product protection. 
Missouri courts have provided guidance on the effect of voluntary 
disclosure. In Edwards v. Missouri State Board of Chiropractic 
Examiners,
117
 the Missouri Court of Appeals confronted the issue of 
whether voluntary disclosure of work-product protected materials 
constituted a waiver of the protection.
118
 There, the court decided an appeal 
by a chiropractor from a trial court’s review of the Administrative Hearing 
Commission (AHC) and the Missouri State Board of Chiropractic 
Examiners (the “Board”).119 The Board revoked the chiropractor’s license 
after he purported to treat a patient with HIV, resulting in the patient’s 
death and the transmission of the disease to his wife and child.
120
 In the 
course of preparing for the administrative hearing, the Board’s attorney 
wrote several letters to individuals including two doctors, an attorney for a 
fact witness, and the mother-in-law of the deceased.
121
 The Board refused to 
provide the materials to the chiropractor, claiming the work product 
protection.
122
 The chiropractor argued that, by disclosing the letters to third 
parties, the Board had waived the protection.
123
 The court held that “[w]ork 
product immunity may be waived by voluntary disclosure of the protected 
information.”124 However, “[a] disclosure made in the pursuit of trial 
preparation and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against 
opponents should . . . be allowed without waiver of the work product 
                                                                                                                 
by or for that other party's representative, including an attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent, only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the 
case and that the adverse party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of 
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall 
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3). 
 116. Compare MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3), with WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26(b)(4). 
 117. 85 S.W.3d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 118. Id. at 27. 
 119. Id. at 14. 
 120. Id. at 15-20. 
 121. Id. at 25-26. 
 122. Id. at 26. 
 123. Id. at 27. 
 124. Id. 
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immunity.”125 The result—that disclosure to non-adversarial parties when 
made “in pursuit of trial preparation” does not result in waiver—is 
consistent with the federal majority position and the purpose of the work 
product protection. 
VI. The Minority Position on Waiver of the Work Product Doctrine 
Contrary to the majority position, which allows disclosures to third 
parties under certain circumstances, at least one circuit court, several 
district courts, and some state courts have held that disclosure to third 
parties of materials protected by the work product protection constitutes a 
waiver of the protection. Wright & Miller suggest that “[d]ecisions to this 
effect confuse the work-product immunity with the attorney-client 
privilege.”126 
A. Federal Jurisprudence 
Contrary to the majority position, in New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. 
Commissioner,
127
 the Sixth Circuit held that there is no reason to 
differentiate between the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
doctrine, finding that both are waived by voluntary disclosure.
128
 Following 
a failed Basis Leveraged Investment Swap Spread (a “BLISS 
transaction”),129 New Phoenix claimed losses of $10,504,462 on its 2001 
tax return,
130
 in contravention of Department of Treasury regulations issued 
in 2000 warning that “the purported losses from such offsetting option 
transactions did not represent bona fide losses reflecting actual economic 
consequences and that the purported losses were not allowable for Federal 
tax purposes.”131 Subsequently, “[t]he IRS issued a notice of deficiency to 
New Phoenix . . . alleging a deficiency of $3,355,906 and a penalty . . . of 
$1,298,284.”132 New Phoenix appealed to the Tax Court.133 During those 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2024. 
 127. 408 F. App’x 908 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 128. Id. at 918. 
 129. A BLISS transaction is a “transaction involv[ing] currency speculation with the 
theoretical chance of a large windfall, but which also allow[s] a partnership engaging in the 
speculation to write off large paper losses on tax returns while suffering only small actual 
losses.” Id. at 911. 
 130. Id. at 911-13. 
 131. Id. at 913. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 914. 
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proceedings, the Tax Court, over New Phoenix’s allegations of attorney-
client privilege and work product protection, admitted several documents 
related to a tax opinion prepared for New Phoenix by New Phoenix’s 
attorneys (for which the work product protection was waived due to New 
Phoenix’s reasonable cause defense) based on a finding of subject matter 
waiver.
134
 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit began its discussion of the work product 
protection by declaring that “[b]oth the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection are waived by voluntary disclosure of private 
communications to third parties.”135 The court continued, stating that 
“[t]here is no compelling reason for differentiating waiver of work product 
from waiver of attorney-client privilege.”136 The court then held that New 
Phoenix had waived the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
protection with regard to the tax opinion and thus, via application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a), had waived the privilege and protection as 
to all other materials related to the same subject matter.
137
 Although the 
opinion is unpublished, it serves to show that, while there is a strong 
majority position, there is also a viable minority position that Oklahoma 
courts may be inclined to follow. Further, the case serves as an example of 
the importance of clarity with regard to the waiver doctrine given the 
potential effects of subject matter waiver under Federal Rule of Evidence 
502(a). 
In addition to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in New Phoenix, several federal 
district courts have found that disclosure of materials protected by the work 
product protection to a third party results in waiver of the protection.
138
 
Each case, however, was decided prior to the codification of the work 
product protection and, as such, provides little persuasive value.
139
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 914, 918. 
 135. Id. at 918. 
 136. Id. (quoting In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d 289, 306 (6th Cir. 
2002)) (alteration in original). It is worth noting that the court arguably misconstrued the 
quote, as it came in the context of selective waiver, not waiver generally, and was 
proceeding by the qualifying statement “[o]ther than the fact that the initial waiver must be 
to an ‘adversary’ . . . .” In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306. 
 137. New Phoenix Sunrise Corp., 408 F. App’x at 919. 
 138. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2024 (“There are some cases that suggest that any 
disclosure of a document to a third person waives the work–product immunity to which it 
would otherwise be entitled.”); see also id. § 2024 n.63 (citing cases). 
 139. Id. (citing cases). 
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B. State Jurisprudence 
While federal law on the issue seems relatively settled, an Oklahoma 
court may well find a basis for adopting the minority position based on the 
decisions of other states, where the law seems less settled. Several states 
have found that voluntary disclosure to a third party results in waiver of the 
work product protection.  
1. Tennessee 
Tennessee’s Rule 26.02140 is similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26 as well as the rules governing discovery in Washington and Missouri, 
discussed above.
141
 Unlike the Federal Rules, which describe the showing 
needed to overcome the work product protection in negative terms 
(“[o]rdinarily, a party may not . . . but . . . may”), the Tennessee Rule 
describes the showing in positive terms (“a party may obtain . . . only 
upon”).142 In substance, however, both rules protect documents prepared by 
or for a party or party’s representative in anticipation of litigation from 
discovery unless the opposing party can show (1) a substantial need for the 
information contained in the documents and (2) that unfair prejudice would 
result from inability to discover such information. Tennessee also has an 
evidentiary rule dealing with waiver of the work product rule, but the rule 
deals only with inadvertent disclosure.
143
 
In Arnold v. City of Chattanooga,
144
 the City of Chattanooga 
commissioned the preparation of two reports to determine the viability of 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(3) reads: 
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (4) of this rule, a party may obtain 
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
subdivision (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial 
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including 
an attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a 
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials 
in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain 
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering 
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the 
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party 
concerning the litigation. 
TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(3). 
 141. Compare TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(3), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), and WASH. 
SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26(b)(4), and MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3). 
 142. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), with TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(3). 
 143. TENN. R. EVID. 502. 
 144. 19 S.W.3d 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). 
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acquiring the privately held company that provided the City’s water 
supply.
145
 A local newspaper and the company the City sought to acquire 
filed separate petitions seeking inspection of the reports under the 
Tennessee Public Records Act.
146
 The trial court found that the reports did 
not constitute work product.
147
 “In order to determine whether the Chancery 
Court was correct in determining the two reports were subject to disclosure 
under the Public Records Act,” it was necessary for the court of appeals to 
“determine whether the reports were work products protected against 
discovery under Rule 26–02(3) or (4) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 
Procedure or the common law work product doctrine.”148 
After finding that the reports constituted work product, the court then 
turned to the issue of whether or not the City had waived the work product 
protection.
149
 Recounting the law of work product protection, the court 
stated that  
[a]n example [of an exception to the work product protection] is 
where the attorney or client has waived the protection by 
voluntarily disclosing the work sought to be protected . . . . 
Disclosure need not be made to the party's adversary in litigation 
to constitute waiver. It can be made extra-judicially, as in 
disclosure to the public of part of the confidential material.
150
  
The court then held that by using the “reports in a public relations 
offensive . . . the City ha[d], in effect, waived its right to claim the work 
product privilege.”151 In sum, the court found that voluntary disclosure 
resulted in waiver of the work product protection. 
2. Delaware 
Delaware Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26 is substantially identical the 
rules governing discovery in Washington, Missouri, and Tennessee.
152
 
However, unlike the rules of any of the previously discussed states, the 
Oklahoma rules, or the Federal Rules, the Delaware Rules of Evidence 
specifically deal with the effect of voluntary disclosure on the work product 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. at 781. 
 146. Id. at 782. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 786. 
 150. Id. at 787 (citation omitted). 
 151. Id. at 788. 
 152. Compare DEL. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), with TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(3), and WASH. 
SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26(b)(4), and MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3). 
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protection.
153
 Rule 510(a) of the Delaware Rules of Evidence explicitly 
mandates that “intentional disclosure” of documents covered by the work 
product protection results in waiver of the protection.
154
 While Oklahoma’s 
Rules of Evidence provide for waiver of privileges via voluntary disclosure, 
unlike the Delaware Rules of Evidence, the Oklahoma Rules do not include 
the work product protection in the list of privileges waived via 
disclosure.
155
 
Consistent with Rule 510, Delaware courts have held that disclosure of 
materials protected by the work product protection waives the protection. 
For example, in Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven,
156
 the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that “[i]t is clear that the disclosure of even a part of the contents 
of a privileged communication surrenders the privilege as to those 
communications.”157 
VII. Tenth Circuit Jurisprudence 
Unlike many of its sister circuits, the Tenth Circuit has not ruled on a 
case explicitly deciding whether disclosure of work-product protected 
materials to a third party waives the protection. The court, however, has 
discussed the work product protection generally and, in at least one case, 
seems to have applied the common interest doctrine to the work product 
protection. While at least one commentator includes the Tenth Circuit in his 
list of courts having adopted the majority view discussed above,
158
 it is 
                                                                                                                 
 153. The Delaware Rules of Evidence provide 
A person waives a privilege conferred by these rules or work-product 
protection if such person or such person's predecessor while holder of the 
privilege or while entitled to work-product protection intentionally discloses or 
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged or protected 
communication or information. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself 
is privileged or protected. 
DEL. R. EVID. 510(a). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Compare 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (2011), with DEL. R. EVID. 510(a). Unlike 
Delaware Rule 510(a), section 2511 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code provides 
A person upon whom this Code confers a privilege against disclosure waives 
the privilege if the person or the person's predecessor voluntarily discloses or 
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. This 
section does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged. 
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511. 
 156. 603 A.2d 818 (Del. 1992). 
 157. Id. at 825. 
 158. See 1 GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 29, § 2:28 n.1. 
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unclear from the court’s decisions how the court would decide a potential 
waiver case. Despite the court’s lack of guidance, given that the court’s 
geographic jurisdiction encompasses Oklahoma, it is possible that an 
Oklahoma court seeking guidance on construing waiver of the work product 
protection would turn to the Tenth Circuit for direction. 
A. Work Product Generally 
The Tenth Circuit, in accord with other courts, has stated the purpose of 
the work product doctrine as “enabl[ing] counsel to prepare a case in 
privacy.”159 Moreover, the doctrine should be interpreted in light of the fact 
that “[i]t ‘is an intensely practical [doctrine], grounded in the realities of the 
litigation in our adversary system.’”160 Like other courts, the court 
recognizes that “[t]he work product privilege may be waived by the 
voluntary release of materials otherwise protected by it.”161 Importantly, 
like courts adopting the majority view, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Qwest 
Communications International, has recognized that whether or not 
disclosure is made to an adversary “affect[s]” the work product doctrine.162 
Moreover, in the same case, the court differentiated between purposeful 
disclosure, inadvertent disclosure, disclosure to non-adverse parties, and 
“disclosure under a confidentiality agreement that prohibits further 
disclosures without the express agreement of the privilege holder.”163 
However, while the Qwest court seemed to indicate an understanding that 
comports with the majority view, on a separate occasion, in United States v. 
Ary, the court stated that waiver of the work product protection will be 
implied “when a party claiming the protection has voluntarily disclosed 
work product to a party not covered by the work-product doctrine.”164 To 
further confuse the matter, the Ary court referred to Qwest as its controlling 
case on waiver by voluntary disclosure.
165
 In sum, while the court has 
discussed the work product doctrine and waiver in several cases, it has yet 
                                                                                                                 
 159. In re Qwest Commc’ns. Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 160. Id. at 1186 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975)). 
 161. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th Cir. 
2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Simmons, Inc. v. Bombardier, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 4, 8 
(D.D.C. 2004)); see also Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1186. 
 162. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1186 (citing In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 163. Id. at 1182. Notably, when discussing disclosure to a non-adverse party, the court 
cited to a district court case following the majority view. See id. (citing In re M & L Bus. 
Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993)). 
 164. 518 F.3d 775, 783 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 165. Id. at 782. 
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to give a clear and controlling example of how it would address a case of 
voluntary disclosure to a third party.  
B. Qwest and the Common Interest Doctrine 
In addition to the broad discussion of work product summarized above, 
in Qwest, the Tenth Circuit also engaged in a discussion of the “common 
interest” doctrine and its application to the work product doctrine. In Qwest, 
a corporation disclosed materials to the DOJ and SEC in the course of an 
investigation.
166
 The disclosure was pursuant to a subpoena and subject to 
confidentiality agreements between Qwest and the agencies.
167
 When the 
plaintiffs in pre-existing securities actions against Qwest sought discovery 
of the documents given to the agencies, Qwest refused, claiming that the 
documents were still protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product protection.
168
 After the district court ordered Qwest to produce the 
documents, Qwest sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth Circuit.
169
 
The crux of Qwest’s argument before the court of appeals was the 
propriety of the selective waiver doctrine.
170
 After a general discussion of 
the work product protection, the court quickly determined that, in the 
absence of the adoption of the theory of selective waiver, the disclosure of 
the documents to the SEC and DOJ would have waived the work product 
protection.
171
 The court went on to reject adoption of the selective waiver 
theory for both attorney-client privilege and the work product protection.
172
  
In the course of rejecting selective waiver, the court engaged in a 
discussion of the purpose of the work product protection as well as that of 
the attorney-client privilege.
173
 When discussing the “generally recognized 
exceptions” to the waiver rule—which, according to the court, “tend to 
serve the purposes of the particular privilege or protection”—the court 
stated that 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1181. 
 167. Id. Although a subpoena was issued, “[a]t oral argument Qwest disclaimed any 
argument that its production of the Waiver Documents to the agencies was involuntary. 
Thus, we take it as settled that Qwest’s production of the Waiver Documents was 
voluntary . . . .” Id. at 1181 n.1. 
 168. Id. at 1182. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See supra Section IV.B. Qwest was cited as an example of a court rejecting the 
selective waiver doctrine. See cases cited supra note 37. 
 171. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1186. 
 172. Id. at 1186-92. 
 173. Id. at 1195. 
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when the disclosure is to a party with a common interest, the 
“joint defense” or “common interest” doctrine provides an 
exception to waiver because disclosure advances the 
representation of the party and the attorney’s preparation of the 
case . . . . [E]stablishing the joint-defense privilege requires 
showing “(1) the documents were made in the course of a joint-
defense effort; and (2) the documents were designed to further 
that effort.”174  
Nonetheless, the court’s general discussion of the common interest doctrine 
provides little direction for attorneys seeking to avoid waiver of the work 
product protection. The court held that Qwest had waived the attorney-
client privilege and the work product protection by voluntarily disclosing 
the documents to the SEC and DOJ.
175
 The court has subsequently cited to 
Qwest as its controlling case regarding waiver of the work product 
protection via voluntary production.
176
 
C. Analysis 
As the Tenth Circuit’s jurisprudence currently stands, it is unclear 
whether the court adheres to the majority view or a different, more 
restrictive version of the waiver doctrine.
177
 A liberal reading of the Tenth 
Circuit’s case law, especially the court’s opening statement in Qwest and 
subsequent discussion of the common interest doctrine, seems to align 
closely with the majority view. The court’s more restrictive statements, 
however, may lend themselves to a restrained reading of the work product 
doctrine, finding that waiver occurs any time disclosure is made to a party 
not already “covered by the doctrine.” Such a view would be especially 
troubling if combined with a restrictive view of the common interest 
privilege. While the former, broader reading is more consistent with the 
purposes of the work product doctrine, it is unclear where the Tenth Circuit 
currently stands, and, thus, how an Oklahoma court would construe the 
court’s opinions. 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. (citations omitted). 
 175. Id. at 1201. 
 176. See United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 783 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 177. The district courts within the Tenth Circuit have not helped to resolve the 
ambiguity. Some have taken a seemingly restrictive view of the work product protection and 
common interest privilege, while others have taken a liberal view more in line with the 
majority position. Compare Stoller v. Funk, No. CIV-11-1144-C, 2013 WL 5517266 (W.D. 
Okla. Oct. 1, 2013), with Citizens Progressive All. v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 241 F. 
Supp. 2d 1342 (D.N.M. 2002). 
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VIII. A Suggested Approach for Oklahoma 
As mentioned above, Oklahoma lacks statutory or common law authority 
governing the effects of disclosure to third parties on the work product 
protection. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the work 
product protection generally, however, may provide an insight into how the 
court may address the issue of waiver.  
A. Oklahoma Work Product Case Law 
In both of the leading cases on the work product protection in Oklahoma, 
Ellison v. Gray
178
 and Scott v. Peterson,
179
 the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
has closely followed the precedent set by the federal courts. In the former 
case, Ellison brought suit in the district court of Oklahoma County against 
An-Son for malicious prosecution following a federal lawsuit prosecuted by 
An-Son against Ellison regarding a disputed oil and gas lease.
180
 An-Son 
proffered “the defense of good faith reliance on [the] advice of counsel,” 
and Ellison responded by “fil[ing] a motion to compel unlimited production 
of documents including the client files, timesheets, invoices, calendars, 
correspondence, telephone and telex records, and all other documents 
normally classified as ordinary work product.”181 When the district court 
denied the motion, Ellison sought a writ of mandamus from the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court “ordering discovery without limitation including some 
materials which could be classified as opinion work product.”182 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court looked to the federal courts for guidance 
regarding the degree to which disclosure of opinion work product could be 
compelled.
183
 The court consulted Hickman v. Taylor,
184
 Upjohn Co. v. 
United States,
185
 and several federal district court cases
186
 before turning to 
                                                                                                                 
 178. 1985 OK 35, 702 P.2d 360. 
 179. 2005 OK 84, 126 P.3d 1232. 
 180. Ellison, ¶¶ 1-4, 702 P.2d at 361-62. 
 181. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 702 P.2d at 362. 
 182. Id. ¶ 5, 702 P.2d at 362. 
 183. Id. ¶ 9, 702 P.2d at 363 (“The Oklahoma Discovery Code, 12 O.S. 1982 Supp. § 
3203(B)(2) tracks Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though we 
have not determined the degree of protection to be afforded attorney work product under § 
3203(B)(2), the federal courts have addressed this troublesome issue under Rule 26(b)(3) 
and its predecessor, Rule 34.”) (footnote omitted). 
 184. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
 185. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 186. The court cited both Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. 
Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1962) and People v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961). 
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Carman v. Fishel,
187
 Oklahoma’s seminal work product case.188 The court 
then held that 
discovery of ordinary work product should be granted only upon 
a convincing showing that the substantial equivalent of the 
materials sought cannot be obtained without undue hardship, if 
at all. In addition, discovery of opinion work product requires 
exclusivity of relevant knowledge within the control of counsel 
which has been placed in issue by the party who seeks to prevent 
disclosure, and pertains only to the extracted prodigy which is 
communicated to the client or to any communications received 
by the client from counsel which is interwoven with opinion 
work product relating to advice of counsel.
189
 
Although the case nowhere addresses the issue of waiver, it provides an 
example of how the Oklahoma Supreme Court addresses uncertain 
questions regarding the Oklahoma Discovery Code. Moreover—and 
importantly for waiver—the court confirmed that it recognizes a distinction 
between the work product protection and the attorney-client privilege.
190
 
In Scott v. Peterson,
191
 the Scotts brought suit against a roofing company 
for damage to their home sustained during reroofing.
192
 The Scotts then 
sought discovery of the roofing company’s insurer’s claim file, to which the 
roofing company and its insurer objected.
193
 The roofing company and its 
insurer sought a protective order, and the Scotts moved to compel 
disclosure.
194
 The district court granted the protective order and denied the 
Scotts’ motion to compel, and the Scotts sought a writ from the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court to compel production.
195
 
The roofing company and its insurer “did not file privilege logs in 
support of their claimed privilege and exemption from discovery.”196 On 
appeal, the Scotts argued that the failure to file a privilege log should result 
in the court compelling disclosure of the file.
197
 Again, just as in Ellison, 
                                                                                                                 
 187. 1966 OK 130, 418 P.2d 963. 
 188. Ellison, ¶¶ 10-15, 702 P.2d at 364-66. 
 189. Id. ¶ 16, 702 P.2d at 366-67. 
 190. Id. ¶ 8, 702 P.2d at 363. 
 191. 2005 OK 84, 126 P.3d 1232. 
 192. Id. ¶ 2, 126 P.3d at 1233. 
 193. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 126 P.3d at 1233. 
 194. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 126 P.3d at 1233, 1234. 
 195. Id. ¶ 5, 126 P.3d at 1234. 
 196. Id. ¶ 16, 126 P.3d at 1236. 
 197. Id. ¶¶ 22, 26, 126 P.3d at 1238, 1239. 
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the court turned to federal jurisprudence for guidance.
198
 Given, however, 
the lack of uniformity among federal courts, the court looked to Wright & 
Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure, which the court then reconciled 
with its interpretation of the Oklahoma statutes involved.
199
 While the court 
declined to rule on the issue due to its hypothetical nature,
200
 Scott v. 
Peterson provides yet another example of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
looking to federal jurisprudence (and, in this case, a widely respected 
treatise on practice in the federal courts) interpreting the Federal Rules for 
guidance when addressing questions regarding the Oklahoma Discovery 
Code.  
B. Statutory Considerations 
Title 12, section 2502 may also provide some guidance with regard to 
how the Oklahoma Supreme Court may rule on the issue of waiver. As 
discussed above, subsections E and F have no bearing on whether voluntary 
disclosure results in waiver.
201
 The adoption of the selective waiver doctrine 
in subsection F, however, is a significant departure from the federal 
scheme, potentially evidencing the Oklahoma Legislature’s willingness to 
split from Oklahoma courts’ exhibited desire to take heed of the federal 
scheme.  
Moreover, in two places, section 2502 addresses the common interest 
doctrine.
202
 Neither subsection is directly applicable to the issue of 
voluntary waiver of the work product protection—subsection (B)(3) deals 
with the common interest doctrine with regard to the attorney-client 
privilege, and subsection (D)(6) deals with matters of common interest 
among clients with an attorney in common. The fact that the Oklahoma 
statutes directly address the issue of the common interest doctrine in the 
context of other privileges, however, may suggest a willingness to adopt a 
similar doctrine with regard to the work product protection. That the 
legislature has spoken to the common interest doctrine is particularly 
helpful given the courts’ silence on the issue.203 
  
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 126 P.3d at 1238 (“The Discovery Code was a [sic] adopted from the 
federal scheme and we have looked to federal authority construing federal Rule 26 for 
guidance when applying our similar provision.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. ¶ 28, 126 P.3d at 1240. 
 201. See supra Part IV. 
 202. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(B)(3) (Supp. 2014); see also id. § 2502(D)(6). 
 203. See Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, ¶ 71, 8 P.3d 883, 909. 
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C. Suggested Approach 
In the end, it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty how an 
Oklahoma court would rule on the issue of waiver of the work product 
protection via voluntary disclosure to a third party. On the one hand, 
Oklahoma courts have acknowledged the differences in the work product 
protection and the attorney client privilege and have relied on federal 
interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that are similar to 
provisions of the Oklahoma Discovery Code. The weight of federal 
precedent suggests that disclosure should result in waiver only in certain 
circumstances. Moreover, the legislature has demonstrated an acceptance of 
the common interest doctrine with regard to the attorney-client privilege.  
On the other hand, though, Oklahoma’s courts have not addressed, even 
in passing, waiver of the work product protection and have not determined 
the parameters of the common interest doctrine outside of that which is 
statutorily required by section 2502. Furthermore, the legislature, via 
adoption of the selective waiver doctrine, has expressed a willingness to 
buck overwhelming precedent at the federal level. In addition, several states 
have rejected the view taken by the federal majority and adopted a more 
restrictive view of the work product protection. Given the haziness 
surrounding the doctrine, this Comment seeks only to provide a suggested 
approach rather than a predicted outcome. 
Ultimately, determining whether or not disclosure of work-product 
protected materials to a third party constitutes waiver is a matter of policy. 
One could choose—as other states have chosen—a policy that values 
secrecy over sharing. Conversely, one could choose a policy that balances 
the need for privacy, rather than absolute secrecy, with the need to share 
information. The latter view has been embraced by other states and the vast 
majority of federal courts, largely because it is the view most consistent 
with the purpose of the work product protection. As the D.C. Circuit made 
clear, “the work product privilege . . . exist[s] . . . to promote the adversary 
system. . . . The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect 
information against opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a 
particular confidential relationship, in order to encourage effective trial 
preparation.”204 A policy consistent with this understanding of the work 
product protection should be adopted in Oklahoma.  
Adopting the majority view is not simply blind devotion to the wisdom 
of the federal courts. Rather, adopting such a policy is the course of action 
most consistent with Oklahoma’s understanding of the work product 
                                                                                                                 
 204. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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doctrine. When Oklahoma adopted the work product protection, it explicitly 
adopted and endorsed the doctrine as espoused in Hickman v. Taylor.
205
 
Moreover, Oklahoma has consistently chosen to view the work product 
protection in a way that comports with the federal courts’ view of the 
doctrine.
206
 Thus, adopting the majority view not only comports with the 
view of the doctrine taken by most federal courts, but with the view of the 
doctrine taken by Oklahoma courts as well. The majority view is the 
understanding of the work product protection that would best further the 
purpose of the Oklahoma work product protection. 
Specifically, Oklahoma would be wise to implement the approach taken 
in United States v. Deloitte,
207
 which provides attorneys with the most 
flexibility while still furthering the purpose of the work product protection. 
Under the Deloitte framework, only disclosures made directly to an 
adversary or a conduit to an adversary waive the work product protection. 
To reiterate, an adversary is a person or entity who may be an “adversary in 
the sort of litigation the [documents] address.”208 Whether or not disclosure 
is made to a “conduit” to an adversary is determined by applying the two-
part maintenance-of-secrecy standard. The standard is applied by 
determining “whether the disclosing party has engaged in self-interested 
selective disclosure by revealing its work product to some adversaries but 
not to others,”209 and then “examin[ing] whether the disclosing party had a 
reasonable basis for believing that the recipient would keep the disclosed 
material confidential.”210 The reasonable belief in confidentiality can stem 
either from common litigation interests or a “relatively strong and 
sufficiently unqualified” confidentiality agreement.211  
Undoubtedly, this approach is among the most liberal of those endorsed 
by federal courts. This approach, however, gives attorneys the flexibility 
necessary to adequately prepare for litigation—a must in the adversarial 
system—while also preserving the “certain degree of privacy” that 
Hickman sought to ensure. Under this framework, attorneys have the ability 
to prepare for anticipated multiparty litigation (one of the overarching 
themes of the work product doctrine) without having to wait for litigation to 
commence. The framework also protects the doctrine’s underlying purpose 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See Carman v. Fishel, 1966 OK 130, ¶¶ 12-16, 418 P.2d 963, 968-70. 
 206. See supra Section VIII.A. 
 207. 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see supra Section V.A.1. 
 208. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 140. 
 209. Id. at 141. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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by prohibiting disclosure to adversaries generally or to any party without a 
common litigation interest or confidentiality agreement.  
Clarity in the area of privileges and protections is paramount, and the 
suggested framework provides a straightforward, easily applied set of rules 
that removes the guesswork and uncertainty that is currently present due to 
the ambiguous state of the law. Whether by judicial decision or legislative 
adoption, Oklahoma should adopt a rule allowing disclosure of work-
product protected materials to non-adversarial third parties who share a 
common interest or who are subject to a strong confidentiality agreement 
without waiving the protection.  
IX. Conclusion 
Oklahoma’s attorneys need clarity with regard to the work product 
protection. Given the existing uncertainty regarding Oklahoma’s 
interpretation of the waiver doctrines, attorneys are (or should be) loath to 
share sensitive information with third parties, even if sharing such 
information would further the adversarial process and the attorney’s 
preparation of the case. The status quo is entirely inconsistent with the 
purpose of the work product protection, and a rule that would require such 
secrecy is equally inconsistent. Rather, Oklahoma should join other states 
and the vast majority of federal courts by adopting a rule that, under certain, 
well-defined circumstances, allows disclosure of materials protected by the 
work product protection to third parties without resulting in waiver of the 
protection. 
 
Mitchell B. Bryant 
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